kmacht wrote:For those of you who believe that paying attention to detail during assembly will give you a reliable aerovee engine, how do you square that against the fact that two factory aircraft had their engines fail on takeoff with disastrous results?
Keith -
Emotion and confidence are tricky things and I don't know that any one logical explanation can change someone's position (...and I'm not saying that it necessarily should). For myself, as someone who's had problems with the engine parts I was given to assemble into an AeroVee, I consider the following things:
1) Every engine on an aircraft has failed at least once or twice. Lycomings and Continentals have been the reason why planes have crashed. ADs and Service Bulletins make it plain that there is nothing magical or bullet-proof about their design - plenty of weaknesses and improper parts have been identified in those documents over time. Their long legacy means that there has been more time for all the engineering to be vetted and many weak points addressed, and we shouldn't completely discount the earned wisdom due to their legacy/history. But at the same time they are still complicated devices with many moving pieces that experience stress, fatigue, and neglect and therefore have had (and will continue to have) failures.
2) There are a few hundred AeroVee engines out there, but they aren't regularly falling out of the sky - if they had major failures on a frequent basis, we'd hear about it. There are plenty of stories of people running into problems during assembly or early running of their engines - some due to parts problems and lack of attention by suppliers, some due to poor assembly by builders; but far fewer stories about people making off-field landings and trashing their aircraft due to an in-flight failure of the engine. You don't see NTSB or Kathryn's Report links to AeroVee-powered airplane accidents popping up on a regular cadence every week or every month.
3) The Turbo failure / crash happened back with v1 of the Turbo installation - one which we know exacerbates heat-soaking of the turbo after shutdown and hence lots of potential for oil coking / turbo seizing. And as the NTSB pointed out, had they chosen to make a full-runway takeoff instead of an intersection takeoff the outcome might have been a whole lot different. I say this not to disparage the departed, but to point out that it was a confluence of multiple factors - not just the engine - that resulted in fatalities. Our opinions & emotions are often shaped at a high-level by outcomes, rather than examination of what went wrong and the processes that led to the outcome. The improved turbo system today appears to be better at dealing with the oil coking problems; but still isn't perfect and requires close observation/maintenance. I know several Turbo owners who've removed the system and are very upset at the deficiencies of the original design and the apparent lack of expert knowledge and testing (especially vis-a-vis longevity and reliability) - but most of these same people are still running the engine as a normally-aspirated AeroVee and they haven't switched to an entirely different powerplant. I think that says something about the underlying system being adequate for our purposes.
(Side-note: as someone who bought a turbo kit in late 2016, I eagerly await the reveal of the prototype water cooling system that Mark mentioned on the forum here a couple of weeks ago. I hope it is available before I have put many hours on the engine as I feel that it is important for the long-term viability of the Turbo system).
4) As for the crash of N12YX, I find several things notable. First, the NTSB did not inspect the scene of the accident. Second, there is no mention of the NTSB checking the carb system - which I find interesting given the change in engine sound, drop in RPM, and action by the instructor to fiddle with the mixture control at ~200 ft AGL. Personally, in a moment of surprise during the early ground-testing of my engine, I accidentally yanked my mixture cable loose (as I hadn't secured the cable as strongly as I should - I focused too much on making sure the control swiveled smoothly and not enough on the cable being firmly locked into swivel by the set screw). So I wonder if something on the carb came loose on N12YX? We'll never know. But the point is that all the NTSB report mentions is low compression on 2 cylinders and 2 exhaust valves that were worn. We don't know *which* 2 cylinders. We don't know what the compression was. Famed A&P Mike Busch has shown that low compression on cylinders don't usually cause much of a loss of power (he has EAA/AOPA webinars & articles that go into this in-detail). But we don't know to what degree the exhaust valves were leaking/failing; which may have been a more severe problem than just leaky piston rings or a grooved cylinder bore allowing blow-by. We don't know what the fuel situation was, or whether this might have been fuel-flow related. We don't know how recently the engine had been run or how frequently it had been run over the past 12 months (engines like to be run regularly to keep moisture and corrosion levels low). We don't know when its oil was last changed, when it got its last compression check or borescope inspection, what the spark-plugs looked like, whether a spark plug wire got melted by an exhaust pipe, whether the intake manifold had developed any leaks, and on and on... The loss of power was sudden; but the underlying issue may have been a slow creeping problem that could have been detected earlier. We just don't know. However, if it was a major deficiency in the design of the engine there's no reason for Sonex to keep that a secret. Doing so would only lead to much worse repercussions (for the business and in terms of legal liability) later on when word got out or evidence mounted that this was a common problem. And the only (non-Turbo) service bulletin that appears to have been issued within a few months of this accident is the one stating that fully synthetic oils should not be used. An important SB to know and to heed; but not any kind of indictment of the engine itself.
5) Of the AeroVees that have failed, we haven't seen a consistent failure of a single part, or within one specific section of the powerplant system. If there was a major flaw or weak point in the base AeroVee, we'd expect to see the same problem identified repeatedly in accidents or teardowns of engines (witness the seized turbine in the Turbo engines, which definitely appears to be a common thread across several of those failures). Since we don't see that commonality in parts failures across the AeroVee lineup, it lends me confidence that the core of the system is adequate for the stresses / loads that we put on it.
Having said all that, I can identify with your comment about some of the fun being taken out of it. Frustrations with receiving improperly machined and non-QC'ed parts have had an impact on me. Personally, I have resolved _not_ to obsess over the money I've already spent or the time I've sunk into dealing with issues - because focusing on that isn't going to get my plane in the air or make sure its safe for my wife to fly. What I choose to do instead is focus on ensuring that every step I take advances me towards a safe, flyable airplane. And I keep that "mission" in mind whenever I look at a part, assemble an item, or weigh the validity of the factory's documentation/advice/responses.
Take care and best of luck,
--Noel